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Abstract
Combining an information-theoretic approach to finger-
printing with a more constructive, statistical approach,
we derive new results on the fingerprinting capacities for
various informed settings, as well as new log-likelihood
decoders with provable code lengths that asymptotically
match these capacities. The simple decoder built against
the interleaving attack is further shown to achieve the sim-
ple capacity for unknown attacks, and is argued to be an
improved version of the recently proposed decoder of Oost-
erwijk et al. With this new universal decoder, cut-offs on
the bias distribution function can finally be dismissed.
Besides the application of these results to fingerprinting,
a direct consequence of our results to group testing is that
(i) a simple decoder asymptotically requires a factor 1.44
more tests to find defectives than a joint decoder, and
(ii) the simple decoder presented in this paper provably
achieves this bound.
1 Introduction
To protect copyrighted content against unauthorized redis-
tribution, distributors may embed watermarks or finger-
prints in the content, uniquely linking copies to individual
users. Then, if an illegal copy of the content is found, the
distributor can extract the watermark from the copy and
compare it to the database of watermarks, to determine
which user was responsible.
To combat this solution, pirates may try to form a coali-
tion of several colluders, each owning a differently water-
marked copy of the content, and perform a collusion at-
tack. By comparing their different versions of the content,
they will detect differences in their copies which must be
part of the watermark. They can then create a new pi-
rate copy, where the resulting watermark matches the wa-
termark of different pirates in different segments of the
content, making it hard for the distributor to find the re-
sponsible users. Fortunately, under the assumption that
if the pirates don’t detect any differences (because they
all received the same version) they output this watermark
(known in the literature as the Boneh-Shaw marking as-
sumption [5]), it is still possible to find all colluders using
suitable fingerprinting codes.
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1.1 Model
The above fingerprinting game is often modeled as the fol-
lowing two-person game between the distributor D and the
coalition of pirates C. The set of colluders is assumed to be
a random subset of size |C| = c from the complete set of n
users U , and the identities of these colluders are unknown
to the distributor. The aim of the game for the distribu-
tor is ultimately to discover the identities of the colluders,
while the colluders want to stay hidden. The game con-
sists of the following three phases: (i) the distributor uses
an encoder to generate the fingerprints; (ii) the colluders
employ a collusion channel to generate the pirate output,
and (iii) the distributor uses a decoder to map the pirate
output to a set of accused users.
Encoder First, the distributor generates a fingerprint-
ing code X , consisting of n code words X1, . . . ,Xn from
{0, 1}`.1 The ith entry of code word j indicates which ver-
sion of the content is assigned to user j in the ith segment.
The parameter ` is referred to as the code length, and the
distributor would like ` to be as small as possible.
A common restriction on the encoding process is to as-
sume that X is created by first generating a probability
vector P ∈ [0, 1]` by choosing each entry Pi independently
from a certain distribution function F , and then generat-
ing X according to P(Xj,i = 1) = Pi. This guarantees
that watermarks of different users j are independent, and
that watermarks in different positions i are independent.
Schemes that satisfy this assumption are sometimes called
bias-based schemes, and the encoders discussed in this pa-
per also belong to this category.
Collusion channel After generating X , the entries are
used to select and embed watermarks in the content, and
the content is sent out to all users. The colluders then get
together, compare their copies, and use a certain collu-
sion channel or pirate attack θ to select the pirate output
Y ∈ {0, 1}`. If the pirate attack behaves symmetrically
both in the colluders and in the positions i, then the col-
lusion channel can be modeled by a vector θ ∈ [0, 1]c+1,
consisting of entries θz = fY |Z(1|z) indicating the proba-
bility of outputting a 1 when the pirates received z ones
and c − z zeroes. Some common attacks θ are described
in Section 2.3.
1More generally X is a code with code words of length ` from an
alphabet Q of size q ≥ 2, but in this paper we restrict our attention
to the binary case q = 2.
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Decoder Finally, after the pirate output has been gen-
erated and distributed, we assume that the distributor in-
tercepts it and applies a decoding algorithm to the pirate
output Y , the code X and the (secret) bias vector P to
compute a set C′ ⊆ U of accused users. This is commonly
done by assigning scores to users, and accusing those users
whose score exceeds some predefined threshold η. The dis-
tributor wins the game if C′ is non-empty and contains only
colluders (i.e. ∅ 6= C′ ⊆ C) and loses if this is not the case,
which could be because an innocent user j /∈ C is falsely
accused (a false positive error), or because no guilty users
are accused (a false negative error). We often write ε1 and
ε2 for upper bounds on the false positive and false negative
probabilities respectively.
1.2 Related work
Work on the above bias-based fingerprinting game started
in 2003, when Tardos proved that any fingerprinting
scheme must satisfy ` ∝ c2 lnn, and that a bias-based
scheme is able to achieve this optimal scaling in ` [38]. He
proved the latter by providing a simple and explicit con-
struction with a code length of ` = 100c2 ln(n/ε1), which
is known in the literature as the Tardos scheme.
Improved constructions Later work on the construc-
tive side of fingerprinting focused on improving upon Tar-
dos’ result by sharpening the bounds [3, 35], optimizing
the distribution functions [27], improving the score func-
tion [36], tightening the bounds again with this improved
score function [18, 22, 28, 34, 36, 37], optimizing the score
function [29], and again tightening the bounds with this
optimized score function [16, 30] to finally end up with a
sufficient asymptotic code length of ` ∼ 2c2 lnn for large n.
This construction can be extended to larger alphabets, in
which case the code length scales as ` ∼ 2c2 ln(n)/(q − 1).
Other work on practical constructions focused on joint de-
coders, which are computationally more involved but may
work with shorter codes [24,25,31], and side-informed fin-
gerprinting games [7, 10, 21, 29], where estimating the col-
lusion channel θ was considered to get an improved per-
formance.
Recently Abbe and Zheng [1] showed that, in the con-
text of fingerprinting [24], if the set of allowed collusion
channels satisfies a certain one-sidedness condition, then
a decoder that achieves capacity against the information-
theoretic worst-case attack is a universal decoder achiev-
ing capacity against arbitrary attacks. The main draw-
back of using this result is that the worst-case attack is
hard to compute, but this does lead to more insight why
e.g. Oosterwijk et al. [30] obtained a universal decoder by
considering the decoder against the ‘interleaving attack’,
which is known to be the asymptotic worst-case attack.
Fingerprinting capacities At the same time, work was
also done on establishing bounds on the fingerprinting ca-
pacity C, which translate to lower bounds on the required
asymptotic code length ` through ` & C−1 log2 n for large
n. For the binary case Huang and Moulin [11–14, 25] and
Amiri and Tardos [2] independently derived exact asymp-
totics for the fingerprinting capacity for arbitrary attacks
as C ∼ (2c2 ln 2)−1, corresponding to a minimum code
length of ` ∼ 2c2 lnn. Huang and Moulin [14] further
showed that to achieve this bound, an encoder should use
the arcsine distribution F ∗ for generating biases p:
F ∗(p) =
2
pi
arcsin
√
p. (0 < p < 1) (1)
These capacity-results were later generalized to the q-ary
setting [4, 15] showing that a q-ary code length of ` ∼
2c2 ln(n)/(q − 1) is asymptotically optimal.
Dynamic fingerprinting There has also been some in-
terest in a variant of the above fingerprinting game where
several rounds of the two-player game between the distrib-
utor and the coalition are played sequentially. This allows
the distributor to adjust the encoding and decoding steps
of the next rounds to the knowledge obtained from pre-
vious rounds. Many of the bias-based constructions can
also be used effectively in this dynamic setting [17, 20, 21]
with equivalent asymptotics for the required code length,
but allowing the distributor to trace all colluders even if
the collusion channel is not symmetric in the colluders,
and leading to significantly smaller first order terms than
in the ‘static’ setting. These bias-based dynamic schemes
may even be able to compete with the celebrated scheme
of Fiat and Tassa [9].
Group testing Finally, a different area of research
closely related to fingerprinting is that of group testing,
where the set of n users corresponds to a set of n items,
the set of c colluders corresponds to a subset of c defec-
tive items, and where the aim of the distributor is to find
all defective items by performing group tests. This game
corresponds to a special case of the fingerprinting game,
where the pirate attack is fixed in advance (and possi-
bly known to the distributor) to (a variant of) the ‘all-1
attack’. In this game it is significantly easier to find all
pirates/defectives; it is known that a joint decoder asymp-
totically requires only ` ∼ c log2 n tests [33], while simple
decoders exist requiring as few as ` ∼ ec lnn tests to find
all defectives [6]. Recent work has shown that applying
results from fingerprinting to group testing may lead to
improved results compared to what is known in the group
testing literature [19,23].
1.3 Contributions
In this work we first extend the work of Huang and
Moulin [14] by deriving explicit asymptotics for the simple
and joint capacities of various fingerprinting games with
different amounts of side-information. Table 1 summarizes
tight lower bounds on the code length constant for vari-
ous informed settings obtained via the capacities. These
asymptotics can be seen as our ‘targets’ for the second
part of this paper, which describes decoders with provable
bounds on ` and η that asymptotically achieve these ca-
pacities. In fact, if the collusion channel that the decoder
was built against matches the attack used by the pirates,
then the proof that the resulting simple decoders achieve
2
Table 1: Asymptotics for tight lower bounds on L = `/ lnn ∼=
C−1/ ln 2, based on the simple and joint capacities, with different
amounts of side information (see Section 2.2). The proposed simple
decoders are shown to match these bounds, and we conjecture that
the proposed joint decoders are also asymptotically optimal.
Fully informed Partially informed
Simple Joint Simple Joint
Interleaving atk. 2c2 2c2 2c2 2c2
All-1 attack 2.08c 1.44c 1.83c
√
c 1.32c
√
c
Majority voting 3.14c 1.44c 2.41c
√
c 1.20c
√
c
Minority voting 2.08c 1.44c 0.66c
√
c 0.43c
√
c
Coin-flip attack 8.33c 4.48c 5.18c
√
c 2.32c
√
c
capacity is remarkably simple and holds for arbitrary at-
tacks.
Capacity-achieving simple decoding without cut-
offs Similar to Oosterwijk et al. [29,30], who studied the
decoder built against the interleaving attack because that
attack is in a sense optimal, we then turn our attention
to the simple decoder designed against the interleaving
attack, and argue that it is an improved version of Ooster-
wijk et al.’s universal decoder. To provide a sneak preview
of this result, the new score function is the following:
g(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pc(1−p)
)
x = y = 0
ln
(
1− 1c
)
x 6= y
ln
(
1 + 1−pcp
)
x = y = 1
(2)
This decoder is shown to achieve the uninformed simple
capacity, and we argue that with this decoder (i) the Gaus-
sian assumption always holds (and convergence to the nor-
mal distribution is much faster), and (ii) no cut-offs on the
bias distribution function F are ever needed anymore.
Joint log-likelihood decoders Since it is not hard to
extend the definition of the simple decoder to joint de-
coding, we also present and analyze joint log-likelihood
decoders. Analyzing these joint decoders turns out to be
somewhat harder due to the ‘mixed tuples’, but we give
some motivation why these decoders seem to work well.
We also conjecture that the joint decoder tailored against
the interleaving attack achieves the joint uninformed ca-
pacity, but proving this result is left for future work.
Applications to group testing Since the all-1 at-
tack in fingerprinting is equivalent to a problem known
in the literature as group testing [21, 23], some of our re-
sults can also be applied to this area. In fact, we de-
rive two new results in the area of group testing: (i) any
simple-decoder group testing algorithm requires at least
` ∼ log2(e)2c lnn ≈ 2.08c lnn group tests to find c defec-
tive items hidden among n items, and (ii) the decoder dis-
cussed in Section 4.1 provably achieves this optimal scaling
in `. This decoder was previously considered in [23], but
no provable bounds on the (asymptotic) code lengths were
given there.
1.4 Outline
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 first de-
scribes the various different models we consider in this pa-
per, and provides a roadmap for Sections 3 and 4. Sec-
tion 3 discusses capacity results for each of these models,
while Section 4 discusses decoders which aim to match
the lower bounds on ` obtained in Section 3. Finally, in
Section 5 we conclude with a brief discussion of the most
important results and remaining open problems.
2 Different models
Let us first describe how the results in Sections 3 and 4
are structured according to different assumptions, leading
to different models. Besides the general assumptions on
the model discussed in the introduction, we further make a
distinction between models based on (1) the computational
complexity of the decoder, (2) the information about θ
known to the distributor, and (3) the collusion channel
used by the pirates. These are discussed in Sections 2.1,
2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
2.1 Decoding complexity
Commonly two types of decoders are considered, which
use different amounts of information to decide whether a
user should be accused or not.
1. Simple decoding: To quote Moulin [25, Section 4.3]:
“The receiver makes an innocent/guilty decision on
each user independently of the other users, and there
lies the simplicity but also the suboptimality of this
decoder.” In other words, the decision to accuse user
j depends only on the jth code word of X , and not
on other code words from X .
2. Joint decoding: In this case, the decoder is allowed
to base the decision whether to accuse a user on the
entire code X . Such decoders may be able to obtain
smaller code lengths than possible with the best sim-
ple decoders.
Using more information generally causes the time com-
plexity of the decoding step to go up, so usually there is
a trade-off between a shorter code length and a faster de-
coding algorithm.
2.2 Side-informed distributors
We consider three different scenarios with respect to the
knowledge of the distributor about the collusion channel
θ. Depending on the application, different scenarios may
apply.
1. Fully informed: Even before X is generated, the
distributor already knows exactly what the pirate at-
tack θ will be. This information can thus be used
to optimize both the encoding and decoding phases.
This scenario applies to various group testing models,
and may apply to dynamic traitor tracing, where af-
ter several rounds the distributor may have estimated
the pirate strategy.
3
2. Partially informed: The tracer does not know in
advance what collusion channel will be used, so the
encoding is aimed at arbitrary attacks. However, af-
ter obtaining the pirate output y, the distributor does
learn more about θ before running an accusation al-
gorithm, e.g. by estimating the attack based on the
available data. So the encoding is uninformed, but
we assume that the decoder is informed and knows
θ. Since the asymptotically optimal bias distribution
function F in fingerprinting is known to be the arc-
sine distribution F ∗, we will assume that F ∗ is used
for generating biases. This scenario is similar to EM
decoding [7, 10].
3. Uninformed: In this case, both the encoding and de-
coding phases are assumed to be done without prior
knowledge about θ, so also the decoder should be de-
signed to work against arbitrary attacks. This is the
most commonly studied fingerprinting game.
For simplicity of the analysis, in the partially informed set-
ting we assume that the estimation of the collusion chan-
nel is precise, so that θ is known exactly to the decoder.
This assumption may not be realistic, but at least we can
then obtain explicit expressions for the capacities, and get
an idea of how much estimating the strategy may help in
reducing the code length. This also allows us to derive ex-
plicit lower bounds on `: even if somehow the attack can
be estimated correctly, then the corresponding capacities
tell us that we will still need at least a certain number of
symbols to find the pirates.
2.3 Common collusion channels
As mentioned in the introduction, we assume that col-
lusion channels satisfy the marking assumption, which
means that θ0 = 0 and θc = 1. For the remaining val-
ues of z ∈ {1, . . . , c− 1} the pirates are free to choose how
often they want to output a 1 when they receive z ones.
Some commonly considered attacks are listed below.
1. Interleaving attack: The coalition randomly selects
one of its members and outputs his symbol. This cor-
responds to (θint)z = z/c. This attack is known to be
asymptotically optimal (from the point of view of the
colluders) in the uninformed max-min fingerprinting
game [14].
2. All-1 attack: The pirates output a 1 whenever they
can, i.e., whenever they have at least one 1. This
translates to (θall1)z = 1{z > 0}. This attack is of
particular interest due to its relation with group test-
ing.
3. Majority voting: The colluders output the most
common symbol among their received symbols. This
means that (θmaj)z = 1{z > c/2}.
4. Minority voting: The traitors output the symbol
which they received the least often (but received at
least once). For 1 ≤ z ≤ c − 1, this corresponds to
(θmin)z = 1{z < c/2}.
5. Coin-flip attack: If the pirates receive both sym-
bols, they flip a fair coin to decide which symbol to
output. So for 1 ≤ z ≤ c − 1, this corresponds to
(θcoin)z =
1
2 .
For even c, defining θc/2 in a consistent way for majority
and minority voting is not straightforward. For simplicity,
in the analysis of these two attacks we will therefore as-
sume that c is odd. Note that in the uninformed setting,
we do not distinguish between different collusion channels;
the encoder and decoder should then work against arbi-
trary attacks.
2.4 Roadmap
The upcoming two sections about capacities (Section 3)
and decoders (Section 4) are structured according to the
above classification, where first the decoding complexity
is chosen, then the side-information is fixed, and finally
different attacks are considered. For instance, to find the
joint capacity in the fully informed game one has to go
to Section 3.2.1, while the new simple uninformed decoder
can be found in Section 4.1.3.
3 Capacities
In this section we establish lower bounds on the code
length of any valid decoder, by inspecting the information-
theoretic capacities of the various fingerprinting games.
We will use some common definitions from information
theory, such as the binary entropy function h(x) =
−x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x), the relative entropy or
Kullback-Leibler divergence d(x‖y) = x log2(x/y) + (1 −
x) log2((1 − x)/(1 − y)), and the mutual information
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y P(x, y) log2(P(x, y)/P(x)P(y)). The re-
sults in this section build further upon previous work on
this topic by Huang and Moulin [14].
3.1 Simple capacities
For simple decoders, we assume that the decision whether
to accuse user j is based solely on Xj , Y and P . Focusing
on a single position, and denoting the random variables
corresponding to a colluder’s symbol, the pirate output,
and the bias in this position by X1, Y and P , the in-
teresting quantity to look at [11] is the mutual informa-
tion I(X1;Y |P = p). This quantity depends on the pi-
rate strategy θ and on the bias p. To study this mutual
information we will use the following equality [14, Equa-
tion (61)],
I(X1;Y |P = p) = pd(a1‖a) + (1− p)d(a0‖a), (3)
4
where a, a0, a1 are defined as
a =
c∑
z=0
(
c
z
)
pz(1− p)c−zθz, (4)
a0 =
c−1∑
z=0
(
c− 1
z
)
pz(1− p)c−z−1θz, (5)
a1 =
c∑
z=1
(
c− 1
z − 1
)
pz−1(1− p)c−zθz. (6)
Note that given p and θ, the above formulas allow us to
compute the associated mutual information explicitly.
3.1.1 Fully informed
In the fully informed setting we are free to choose F to
maximize the capacity, given a collusion channel θ. When
the attack is known to the distributor in advance, there
is no reason to use different values of p; the distributor
should always use the value of p that maximizes the mu-
tual information payoff I(X1;Y |P = p). Given an attack
strategy θ, the capacity we are interested in is thus
Cs(θ) = max
p
I(X1;Y |P = p). (7)
For general attacks finding the optimal value of p analyt-
ically can be hard, but for certain specific attacks we can
investigate the resulting expressions individually to find
the optimal values of p that maximize the mutual infor-
mation. This leads to the following results for the five
attacks listed in Section 2.3. Proofs will appear in the full
version.
Theorem 1. The simple informed capacities and the cor-
responding optimal values of p for the five attacks of Sec-
tion 2.3 are:
Cs(θint) ∼ 1
2c2 ln 2
, psint =
1
2
, (S1)
Cs(θall1) ∼ ln 2
c
, psall1 ∼
ln 2
c
, (S2)
Cs(θmaj) ∼ 1
pic ln 2
, psmaj =
1
2
, (S3)
Cs(θmin) ∼ ln 2
c
, psmin ∼
ln 2
c
, (S4)
Cs(θcoin) ∼ ln 2
4c
, pscoin ∼
ln 2
2c
. (S5)
Since fully informed protection against the all-1 attack
is equivalent to noiseless group testing, and since the code
length ` scales in terms of the capacity C as ` ≥ C−1 log2 n,
we immediately get the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Any simple group testing algorithm for c
defectives and n total items requires an asymptotic number
of group tests ` of at least
` ∼ c lnn
ln(2)2
≈ 2.08c lnn. (8)
Note that this seems to contradict earlier results of [19],
which suggested that under a certain Gaussian assump-
tion, only ` ∼ 2c lnn tests are required. This apparent
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Figure 1: The partially informed simple capacity (multiplied by c3/2)
as a function of c for different pirate attacks. From top to bottom
these curves correspond to minority voting, the all-1 attack, majority
voting, the coin-flip attack, and the interleaving attack. Except for
the interleaving attack, for which the capacity scales as c−2 (the
dashed line), these capacities all seem to scale as c−3/2.
contradiction is caused by the fact that the Gaussian as-
sumption in [19] is not correct in the regime of small p,
for which those results were derived. In fact, the distri-
butions considered in that paper roughly behave like bi-
nomial distributions over ` trials with probability of suc-
cess of O(1/`), which converge to Poisson distributions.
Numerical inspection shows that the relevant distribution
tails are indeed not very Gaussian and do not decay fast
enough. Rigorous analysis of the scores in [19] shows that
an asymptotic code length of about 3c lnn is sufficient
when p ∼ ln(2)/c, which is well above the lower bound
of Corollary 1. Details can be found in the full version.
3.1.2 Partially informed
If the encoder is uninformed, then the best he can do
against arbitrary attacks (for large c) is to generate biases
using the arcsine distribution F ∗. So instead of computing
the mutual information in one point P = p, we now aver-
age over different values of p where p follows the arcsine
distribution. So the capacity we are interested in is given
by
Cs(θ) = EpI(X1;Y |P = p) =
∫ 1
0
I(X1;Y |P = p)
pi
√
p(1− p) dp.
(9)
The resulting integrals are hard to evaluate analytically,
even for large c, although for some collusion channels we
can use Pinsker’s inequality (similar to the proof of [14,
Theorem 7]) to show that Cs(θ) = Ω(c−3/2). And indeed,
if we look at the numerics of c3/2Cs(θ) in Figure 1, it
seems that the partially informed capacity usually scales
as c−3/2. As a consequence, even if the attack can be
estimated exactly, then still a code length of the order
` ∝ c3/2 lnn is required to get a scheme that works. Note
that for the interleaving attack, the capacity scales as c−2.
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3.1.3 Uninformed
For the uninformed fingerprinting game, where both the
encoder and decoder are built to work against arbitrary
attacks, we are interested in the following max-min game:
Cs = max
F
min
θ(F )
EpI(X1;Y |P = p). (10)
Huang and Moulin [14, 15] previously solved this unin-
formed game for asymptotically large coalition sizes c as
follows.
Proposition 1. [15, Theorem 3] The simple uninformed
capacity is given by
Cs ∼ 1
2c2 ln 2
, (11)
and the optimizing encoder F and collusion channel θ
achieving this bound for large c are the arcsine distribu-
tion F ∗ and the interleaving attack θint.
Note that while for the interleaving attack the capac-
ity is the same (up to order terms) for each of the three
side-informed cases, for the four other attacks the capac-
ity gradually increases from O(c−2) to O(c−3/2) to O(c−1)
when the distributor is more and more informed.
3.2 Joint capacities
If the computational complexity of the decoder is not an
issue, joint decoding may be an option. In that case, the
relevant quantity to examine is the mutual information be-
tween the symbols of all colluders, denoted by X1, . . . , Xc,
and the pirate output Y , given P : I(X1, . . . , Xc;Y |P =
p) [14]. Note that Y only depends on X1, . . . , Xc through
Z =
∑
Xi, so I(X1, . . . , Xc;Y |P = p) = I(Z;Y |P = p).
To compute the joint capacities, we use the following con-
venient explicit formula [14, Equation (59)]:
1
c
I(Z;Y |P = p) = 1
c
[h(a)− ah] , (12)
where h(p) = −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) is the binary
entropy function, and ah is defined as
ah =
c∑
z=0
(
c
z
)
pz(1− p)c−zh(θz). (13)
3.2.1 Fully informed
In the fully informed setting, the capacity is again obtained
by considering the mutual information and maximizing it
as a function of p:
Cj(θ) =
1
c
max
p
I(Z;Y |P = p). (14)
Computing this is very easy for the all-1 attack, the ma-
jority voting attack and the minority voting attack, since
one can easily prove that the joint capacity is equal to 1c
whenever the collusion channel is deterministic, e.g. when
θz ∈ {0, 1} for all z. Since the capacity for the interleaving
attack was already known, the only non-trivial case is the
coin-flip attack. A proof of the following theorem can be
found in the full version.
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Figure 2: The partially informed joint capacity, as a function of c,
for different attacks. From top to bottom these are minority voting,
majority voting, the all-1 attack, the coin-flip attack and the inter-
leaving attack. Except for the interleaving attack, these capacities
all seem to scale as c−3/2.
Theorem 2. The joint informed capacities and the cor-
responding optimal values of p for the five attacks of Sec-
tion 2.3 are:
Cj(θint) ∼ 1
2c2 ln 2
, pjint =
1
2
, (J1)
Cj(θall1) =
1
c
, pjall1 ∼
ln 2
c
, (J2)
Cj(θmaj) =
1
c
, pjmaj =
1
2
, (J3)
Cj(θmin) =
1
c
, pjmin =
1
2
, (J4)
Cj(θcoin) ∼ log2(5/4)
c
, pjcoin ∼
ln(5/3)
c
. (J5)
Recall that there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the all-1 attack and group testing, so the result above es-
tablishes firm bounds on the asymptotic number of group
tests required by any probabilistic group testing algorithm.
This result was already known, and was first derived by
Sebo˝ [33, Theorem 2].
3.2.2 Partially informed
For the partially informed capacity we again average over
the mutual information where p is drawn at random from
the arcsine distribution F ∗. Thus the capacity is given by
Cj(θ) =
1
c
EpI(Z;Y |P = p). (15)
Exact results are again hard to obtain, but we can at least
compute the capacities numerically to see how they be-
have. Figure 2 shows the capacities of the five attacks of
Section 2.3. Although the capacities are higher for joint
decoding than for simple decoding, the joint capacities of
all attacks but the interleaving attack also scale as c−3/2.
3.2.3 Uninformed
Finally, if we are working with joint decoders which are
supposed to work against arbitrary attacks, then we are
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interested in the following max-min mutual information
game:
Cj = max
F
min
θ(F )
Ep
1
c
I(Z;Y |P = p). (16)
This joint capacity game was previously solved by Huang
and Moulin [14] who showed that also in the joint game,
the interleaving attack θint and the arcsine distribution F
∗
together form a saddle-point solution to the uninformed
fingerprinting game.
Proposition 2. [14, Theorem 6, Corollary 7] The joint
uninformed capacity is given by
Cj ∼ 1
2c2 ln 2
, (17)
and the optimizing encoder F and collusion channel θ
achieving this bound for large c are the arcsine distribu-
tion F ∗ and the interleaving attack θint.
4 Decoders
After deriving “targets” for our decoders in the previous
section, this section discusses decoders that aim to match
these bounds. We will follow the score-based framework
introduced by Tardos [38], which was later generalized to
joint decoders by Moulin [25]. For simple decoding, this
means that a user j receives a score Sj of the form
Sj =
∑`
i=1
Sj,i =
∑`
i=1
g(Xj,i, yi, pi), (18)
where g is called the score function. User j is then accused
if Sj > η for some threshold η.
For joint decoding, scores are assigned to tuples T =
{j1, . . . , jc} of c distinct users according to
ST =
∑`
i=1
ST,i =
∑`
i=1
g(Xj1,i, . . . , Xjc,i, yi, pi). (19)
In this case, a tuple of users is accused if the joint tuple
score exceeds some other threshold η. Note that this ac-
cusation algorithm is not exactly well-defined, since it is
possible that a user appears both in a tuple that is accused
and in a tuple that is not accused. For the analysis we will
assume that the scheme is only successful if the single tu-
ple consisting of all colluders has a score exceeding η and
no other tuples have a score exceeding η, in which case all
users in the guilty tuple are accused.
4.1 Simple decoders
Several different score functions for the simple decoder set-
ting were considered before, but in this work we will re-
strict our attention to the following log-likelihood scores,
which perform well and turn out to be easy to analyze:
g(x, y, p) = ln
(
Pg(x, y|p)
Pi(x, y|p)
)
. (20)
Here Pg(x, y|p) = P(Xj,i = x, Yi = y|Pi = p, j ∈ C) cor-
responds to the probability of seeing the pair (x, y) when
user j is guilty, and Pi(x, y|p) corresponds to the same
probability under the assumption that j is innocent. Us-
ing this score function g, the complete score of a user is
the logarithm of a Neyman-Pearson score over the entire
codeword:
Sj =
∑`
i=1
ln
(
Pg(xj,i, yi|pi)
Pi(xj,i, yi|pi)
)
= ln
(
Pg(xj ,y|p)
Pi(xj ,y|p)
)
. (21)
Such Neyman-Pearson scores are known to be optimally
discriminative to decide whether to accuse a user or not.
Log-likelihood scores were previously considered in the
context of fingerprinting in e.g. [24, 32].
4.1.1 Fully informed
For the central theorem below, we will make use of the
following function M , which is closely related to the mo-
ment generating functions of scores in one position i for
innocent and guilty users. This function is defined as
M(t) =
∑
x,y
Pi(x, y|p)1−tPg(x, y|p)t (22)
and it satisfies M(t) = EietSj,i = Ege(t−1)Sj,i and M(0) =
M(1) = 1.
Theorem 3. Let p and θ be fixed and known to the dis-
tributor. Let γ = ln(1/ε2)/ ln(n/ε1), and let the threshold
η and code length ` be defined as
η = ln
(
n
ε1
)
, ` =
√
γ(1 +
√
γ)
− lnM(1−√γ) ln
(
n
ε1
)
. (23)
Then with probability at least 1− ε1 no innocent users are
accused (regardless of which collusion channel was used),
and with probability at least 1− ε2 a colluder is caught (if
the collusion channel is indeed θ).
Proof. For innocent users j, we would like to prove that
Pi(Sj > η) ≤ ε1/n, where Sj is the user’s total score over
all positions. If this can be proved, then it follows that
with probability at least (1− ε1/n)n ≥ 1− ε1 no innocent
users are accused. Using the Markov inequality for eαSj
with α > 0 and optimizing over α, we see that the optimum
lies close to α = 1. For simplicity we choose α = 1 which,
combined with the given value of η, leads to the following
bound:
Pi(Sj > η) = min
α>0
Pi(eαSj > eαη) ≤ min
α>0
Ei(eαSj )
eαη
(24)
= min
α>0
∏`
i=1
Ei(eαSj,i)
eαη
= min
α>0
M(α)`
(n/ε1)α
≤ M(1)
`
n/ε1
=
ε1
n
.
(25)
For guilty users, we would like to prove that for an arbi-
trary guilty user j, we have Pg(Sj < η) ≤ ε2. Again using
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Markov’s inequality (but now with a more sophisticated
exponent β =
√
γ) we get
Pg(Sj < η) ≤ min
β>0
Eg(e−βSj )
e−βη
= min
β>0
∏`
i=1
Eg(e−βSj,i)
e−βη
(26)
= min
β>0
M(1− β)`
e−βη
≤ M(1−
√
γ)`
e−
√
γη
= ε2, (27)
where the last equality follows from the definitions of ` and
η of (23).
Compared to previous papers analyzing provable bounds
on the error probabilities, the proof of Theorem 3 is re-
markably short and simple. The only problem is that the
given expression for ` is not very informative as to how
` scales for large n. The following corollary answers this
question, by showing how ` scales for small γ.
Corollary 2. If γ = o(1) then ` achieves the optimal
asymptotic scaling (achieves capacity) for arbitrary p:
` =
log2 n
I(X1;Y |P = p) [1 +O(
√
γ)], (28)
Proof. First, let us study the behavior of M(1 − √γ) for
small γ, by computing the first order Taylor expansion of
M(1−√γ) around γ = 0:
M(1−√γ)
=
∑
x,y
Pg(x, y|p) exp
(
−√γ ln
(
Pg(x, y|p)
Pi(x, y|p)
))
(29)
(a)
=
∑
x,y
Pg(x, y|p)
(
1−√γ ln
(
Pg(x, y|p)
Pi(x, y|p)
)
+O(γ)
)
(30)
= 1−√γ
∑
x,y
Pg(x, y|p) ln
(
Pg(x, y|p)
Pi(x, y|p)
)
+O(γ) (31)
= 1−√γI(X1;Y |P = p) ln 2 +O(γ). (32)
Here (a) follows from the fact that if Pg(x, y|p) = 0, the
factor Pg(x, y|p) in front of the exponentiation would al-
ready cause this term to be 0, while if Pg(x, y|p) > 0, then
also Pi(x, y|p) > 0 and thus the ratio is bounded and does
not depend on γ. Substituting the above result in the
original equation for ` we thus get the result of (28):
` =
√
γ(1 +
√
γ)
− lnM(1−√γ) ln
(
n
ε1
)
(33)
=
√
γ(1 +
√
γ)√
γI(X1;Y |P = p) ln 2 +O(γ) ln
(
n
ε1
)
(34)
=
log2 n
I(X1;Y |P = p) [1 +O(
√
γ)]. (35)
Since the capacities tell us that `/ log2(n) & I(X1;Y |P =
p)−1, it follows that ` asymptotically achieves capacity.
Since this construction is asymptotically optimal regard-
less of p, in the fully informed setting we can now simply
optimize p (using Theorem 1) to get the following results.
Corollary 3. Using the values for p of Theorem 1, the
asymptotics for ` for the five attacks of Section 2.3 are:
`(θint) = 2c
2 ln(n) [1 +O(
√
γ)] , (36)
`(θall1) =
c
ln(2)2
ln(n) [1 +O(
√
γ)] , (37)
`(θmaj) = pic ln(n) [1 +O(
√
γ)] , (38)
`(θmin) =
c
ln(2)2
ln(n) [1 +O(
√
γ)] , (39)
`(θcoin) =
4c
ln(2)2
ln(n) [1 +O(
√
γ)] . (40)
Since the all-1 attack is equivalent to group testing, we
mention this result separately, together with a more ex-
plicit expression for g.
Corollary 4. Let θ = θall1 and let p ≈ ln(2)/c be fixed.
Then the log-likelihood score function g is given by2
g(x, y) =

+1 (x, y) = (0, 0)
−1 +O(1/c) (x, y) = (0, 1)
−∞ (x, y) = (1, 0)
+c (x, y) = (1, 1)
(41)
Using this score function in combination with the pa-
rameters η and ` of Theorem 3, we obtain a simple group
testing algorithm with an asymptotic number of group tests
of
` ∼ c lnn
ln(2)2
≈ 2.08c lnn, (42)
thus achieving the simple group testing capacity.
4.1.2 Partially informed
Since the score functions from Section 4.1.1 achieve capac-
ity for each value of p, using this score function we also
trivially achieve the partially informed capacity when the
arcsine distribution is used. Estimates of these capacities,
and thus the resulting code lengths, can be found in Sec-
tion 3.1.2.
4.1.3 Uninformed
We now arrive at what is arguably one of the most im-
portant results of this paper. Just like Oosterwijk et
al. [29], who specifically studied the score function h tai-
lored against the interleaving attack, we now also take a
closer look at the log-likelihood score function designed
against the interleaving attack. 3 Working out the details,
2To be precise: g(0, 1) = c log2(2− 21/c), and for convenience we
have scaled g by a factor c ln 2.
3Considering the interleaving attack for designing a universal de-
coder is further motivated by the results of Abbe and Zheng [1, 24],
who showed that under certain conditions, the worst-case attack de-
coder is a universal capacity-achieving decoder. The interleaving
attack is theoretically not the worst-case attack for finite c, but since
it is known to be the asymptotic worst-case attack, the difference
between the worst-case attack and the interleaving attack vanishes
for large c.
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this score function is of the form:
g(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pc(1−p)
)
x = y = 0
ln
(
1− 1c
)
x 6= y
ln
(
1 + 1−pcp
)
x = y = 1
(43)
The first thing to note here is that if we denote Oosterwijk
et al.’s [30] score function by h, then g satisfies
g(x, y, p) = ln
(
1 +
h(x, y, p)
c
)
. (44)
If h(x, y, p) = o(c), then by Tayloring the logarithm around
c =∞ we see that g ≈ h/c. Since scaling a score function
by a constant does not affect its performance, this implies
that g and h are then equivalent. Since for Oosterwijk et
al.’s score function one generally needs to use cut-offs on
F that guarantee that h(x, y, p) = o(c) (cf. [16]), and since
the decoder of Oosterwijk et al. is known to asymptotically
achieve the uninformed capacity, we immediately get the
following result.
Proposition 3. The score function g of (43) asymptot-
ically achieves the uninformed simple capacity when the
same cut-offs on F as those in [16] are used.
So optimizing the decoder so that it is resistant against
the interleaving attack again leads to a decoder that is
resistant against arbitrary attacks.
Cutting off the cut-offs Although Proposition 3 is al-
ready a nice result, we can do even better. We can prove
a stronger statement, which shows one of the reasons why
the log-likelihood decoder is probably more practical than
the decoder of Oosterwijk et al.
Theorem 4. The score function g of (43) achieves the
uninformed simple capacity when no cut-offs are used.
sketch. First note that in the limit of large c, the cut-offs of
Ibrahimi et al. converge to 0. So for large c, the difference
between not using cut-offs and using cut-offs is negligible,
as long as the contribution of the tails of p near 0 or 1
to the distribution of user scores is negligible. Since with
this score function g, all moments of both innocent and
guilty user scores are finite (arbitrary powers of logarithms
always lose against the 1/
√
p(1− p) of the arcsine distri-
bution and the decreasing width of the interval between
0 and the cut-off), the tails indeed decay exponentially.
So also without cut-offs this score function asymptotically
achieves the uninformed simple capacity.
Note that the same result does not apply to the score
function of Oosterwijk et al. [30], for which the tails of the
distributions are not Gaussian enough to omit the use of
cut-offs. The main difference is that for small p, the score
function h of [29] scales as 1/p (which explodes when p is
really small), while the log-likelihood decoder g then only
scales as ln(1/p) which is much smaller.
All roads lead to Rome Let us now mention a third
way to obtain a capacity-achieving uninformed simple de-
coder which is again very similar to the two decoders
above. To construct this decoder, we use a Bayesian ap-
proximation of the proposed empirical mutual information
decoder of Moulin [25], and again plug in the asymptotic
worst-case attack, the interleaving attack.
Theorem 5. Using Bayesian inference with an a priori
probability of guilt of P(j ∈ C) = cn , the empirical mutual
information decoder tailored against the interleaving attack
can be approximated with the following score function:
m(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pn(1−p)
)
x = y = 0
ln
(
1− 1n
)
x 6= y
ln
(
1 + 1−pnp
)
x = y = 1
(45)
sketch. For now, let p be fixed. The empirical mutual
information decoder assigns a score Sj to a user j using
Sj =
∑
x,y
Pˆ(x, y) ln
(
Pˆ(x, y)
Pˆ(x)Pˆ(y)
)
=
∑`
i=1
ln
(
Pˆ(xj,i, yi)
Pˆ(xj,i)Pˆ(yi)
)
(46)
where Pˆ(·) denotes the empirical estimate of P(·) based on
the data x, y, p. For large `, these estimates will converge
to the real probabilities, so we can approximate Sj by
Sj ≈
∑`
i=1
ln
(
P(xj,i, yi)
P(xj,i)P(yi)
)
=
∑`
i=1
m(xj,i, yi, pi). (47)
Here P(Xj,i) and P(yi) can be easily computed, but for
computing P(Xj,i, yi) we need to know whether user j is
guilty or not. Using Bayesian inference, we can write
P(x, y) = Pg(x, y)P(j ∈ C) + Pi(x, y)P(j /∈ C). (48)
Assuming an a priori probability of guilt of P(j ∈ C) = c/n,
we can work out the details to obtain
m(x, y, p) = ln
(
1 +
c
n
[
Pg(x, y)
Pi(x, y)
− 1
])
. (49)
Filling in the corresponding probabilities for the interleav-
ing attack, we end up with the score function of (45).
For values of p with o(1) < p < 1− o(1), this decoder is
again equivalent to both the log-likelihood score function
g and Oosterwijk et al.’s score function h.
4.2 Joint decoders
For the joint decoding setting, scores are assigned to tuples
of c users, and again higher scores correspond to a higher
probability of being accused. The most natural step from
the simple log-likelihood decoders to joint decoders seems
to be to use the following joint score function:
g(x1, . . . , xc, y, p) = ln
(
Pgc(x1, . . . , xc, y|p)
Pic(x1, . . . , xc, y|p)
)
. (50)
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Here Pgc(·) is under the assumption that in this tuple all
users are guilty, while for Pic(·) we assume that all users
are innocent. Note that under the assumption that the
attack is colluder-symmetric, the score function only de-
pends on z =
∑c
i=1 xi:
g(x1, . . . , xc, y, p) = g(z, y, p) = ln
(
Pgc(z, y|p)
Pic(z, y|p)
)
. (51)
4.2.1 Fully informed
To analyze the joint decoder, we again make use of the mo-
ment generating function for the score assigned to tuples
of c innocent users. This function is now defined by
M(t) =
∑
z,y
Pic(z, y|p)1−tPgc(z, y|p)t (52)
and it satisfies M(t) = EicetSj,i = Egce(t−1)Sj,i and
M(0) = M(1) = 1. Using similar techniques as in Sec-
tion 4.1.1, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 6. Let p and θ be fixed and known to the dis-
tributor. Let γ = ln(1/ε2)/ ln(n
c/ε1), and let the threshold
η and code length ` be defined as
η = ln
(
nc
ε1
)
, ` =
√
γ(1 +
√
γ)
− lnM(1−√γ) ln
(
nc
ε1
)
. (53)
Then with probability at least 1− ε1 all all-innocent tuples
are not accused, and with probability at least 1 − ε2 the
single all-guilty tuple is accused.
sketch. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.
Instead of n innocent and c guilty users we now have
(
n
c
)
<
nc all-innocent tuples and just 1 all-guilty tuple, which
changes some of the numbers in γ, η and `. We again apply
the Markov inequality with α = 1 for innocent tuples and
β =
√
γ for guilty tuples, to obtain the given expressions
for η and `.
Note that Theorem 6 does not prove that we can actually
find the set of colluders with high probability, since mixed
tuples consisting of both innocent and guilty users also
exist, and these may or may not have a score exceeding η.
This does prove that with high probability we can find a
set C′ of c users, for which (i) all tuples not containing these
users have a score below η, and (ii) the tuple containing
exactly these users has a score above η. Regardless of what
the scores for mixed tuples are, with probability at least
1 − ε1 − ε2 such a set consists and contains at least one
colluder. Furthermore, if this set C′ is unique, then with
high probability this is exactly the set of colluders. But
there is no guarantee that it is unique without additional
proofs. This is left for future work.
To further motivate why using this joint decoder may
be the right choice, the following proposition shows that
at least the scaling of the resulting code lengths is optimal.
Note that the extra c that we get from ln(nc) = c lnn can
be combined with the mutual information I(·) to obtain
1
c I(·), which corresponds to the joint capacity.
Proposition 4. If γ = o(1) then the code length ` of
Theorem 6 scales as
` =
log2 n
1
c I(Z;Y |P = p)
[1 +O(
√
γ)] , (54)
thus asymptotically achieving the optimal code length (up
to first order terms) for arbitrary values of p.
Since the asymptotic code length is optimal regardless of
p, these asymptotics are also optimal when p is optimized
to maximize the mutual information in the fully informed
setting.
Finally, although it is hard to estimate the scores of
mixed tuples with this decoder, just like in [31] we expect
that the joint decoder score for a tuple is roughly equal
to the sum of the c individual simple decoder scores. So
a tuple of c users consisting of k colluders and c − k in-
nocent users is expected to have a score roughly a factor
k/c smaller than the expected score for the all-guilty tu-
ple. So after computing the scores for all tuples of size c,
we can get rough estimates of how many guilty users are
contained in each tuple, and for instance try to find the
set C′ of c users that best matches these estimates. There
are several options for post-processing that may improve
the accuracy of using this joint decoder, which are left for
future work.
4.2.2 Partially informed
As mentioned in Proposition 4, the code length is asymp-
totically optimal regardless of p, so the code length in the
partially uninformed setting is also asymptotically opti-
mal. Asymptotics on ` can thus be obtained by combining
Proposition 4 with the results of Section 3.2.2.
4.2.3 Uninformed
Note that if the above joint decoder turns out to work
well, then we can again plug in the interleaving attack to
get something that might just work well against arbitrary
attacks. While we cannot prove that this joint decoder is
optimal, we can already see what the score function would
be, and conjecture that it works against arbitrary attacks.
Conjecture 1. The joint log-likelihood decoder against the
interleaving attack, with the score function g defined by
g(z, y, p) =
{
ln(1− zc )− ln(1− p) (y = 0)
ln( zc )− ln(p) (y = 1)
(55)
works against arbitrary attacks and asymptotically
achieves the joint capacity of the uninformed fingerprinting
game.
A further study of this universal joint decoder is left as
an open problem.
5 Discussion
Let us now briefly discuss the results from Sections 3 and
4, their consequences, and some directions for future work.
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Informed simple decoding For the setting of sim-
ple decoders, we derived explicit asymptotics on the in-
formed capacities for various attacks, which often scale
as Θ(c−1). We further showed that log-likelihood scores
provably match these bounds for large n, regardless of θ
and p. Because these decoders are optimal for any value
of p, they are also optimal in the partially informed set-
ting, where different values of p are used. If the encoder
uses the arcsine distribution to generate biases, we showed
that these capacities generally seem to scale as Θ(c−3/2),
which is roughly ‘halfway’ between the fully informed and
uninformed capacities.
Uninformed simple decoding Although log-
likelihood decoders have already been studied before
in the context of fingerprinting, the main drawback was
always that to use these decoders, you would either have
to fill in (and know) the exact pirate strategy, or compute
the worst-case attack explicitly. So if you are in the sim-
ple uninformed setting where you don’t know the pirate
strategy and where the worst-case attack is not given by
a nice closed-form expression [14, Fig. 4b], how can you
construct such decoders for large c? The trick seems to
be to just fill in the asymptotic worst-case attack, which
Huang and Moulin showed is the interleaving attack [14],
and which is much simpler to analyze. After previously
suggesting this idea to Oosterwijk et al., we now used the
same trick here to obtain two other capacity-achieving
score functions using two different methods (but each
time filling in the interleaving attack). So in total we
now have three different methods to obtain (closed-form)
capacity-achieving decoders in the uninformed setting:
• Using Lagrange-multipliers, Oosterwijk et al. [29] ob-
tained:
h(x, y, p) =

+ p1−p x = y = 0
−1 x 6= y
+ 1−pp x = y = 1
(56)
• Using Neyman-Pearson-based log-likelihood scores,
we obtained:
g(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pc(1−p)
)
x = y = 0
ln
(
1− 1c
)
x 6= y
ln
(
1 + 1−pcp
)
x = y = 1
(57)
• Using a Bayesian approximation of the empirical mu-
tual information decoder of Moulin [25], we obtained:
m(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pn(1−p)
)
x = y = 0
ln
(
1− 1n
)
x 6= y
ln
(
1 + 1−pnp
)
x = y = 1
(58)
For o(1) < p < 1−o(1) and large c, n, these score functions
are equivalent up to a scaling factor:
h(x, y, p) ∼ c · g(x, y, p) ∼ n ·m(x, y, p), (59)
and therefore all three are asymptotically optimal. So
there may be many different roads that lead to Rome,
but they all seem to have one thing in common: to build a
universal decoder that works against arbitrary attacks, one
should build a decoder that works against the asymptotic
worst-case pirate attack, the interleaving attack. And if
it does work against this attack, then it probably works
against any other attack as well.
Joint decoding Although deriving the joint informed
capacities is much easier than deriving the simple informed
capacities, actually building decoders that provably match
these bounds is a different matter. We conjectured that
the same log-likelihood scores achieve capacity when a suit-
able accusation algorithm is used, and we conjectured that
the log-likelihood score built against the interleaving at-
tack achieves the uninformed joint capacity, but we cannot
prove any of these statements beyond reasonable doubt.
For now this is left as an open problem.
Group testing Since the all-1 attack is equivalent to
group testing, some of the results we obtained also apply to
group testing. The joint capacity was already known [33],
but to the best of our knowledge both the simple capac-
ity (Corollary 1) and a simple decoder matching this sim-
ple capacity (Corollary 4) were not yet known before. At-
tempts have been made to build efficient simple decoders
with a code length not much longer than the joint capac-
ity [6], but these do not match the simple capacity. Future
work will include computing the capacities and building
decoders for various noisy group testing models, where the
marking assumption may not apply.
Dynamic fingerprinting Although this paper focused
on applications to the ‘static’ fingerprinting game, the con-
struction of [20] can trivially be applied to the decoders in
this paper as well to build efficient dynamic fingerprinting
schemes. Although the asymptotics for the code length
in this dynamic construction are the same, (i) the order
terms are significantly smaller in the dynamic game, (ii)
one does not need the assumption that the pirate strat-
egy is colluder-symmetric, and (iii) one does not necessar-
ily need to know (a good estimate of) c in advance [20,
Section V]. An important open problem remains to de-
termine the dynamic uninformed fingerprinting capacity,
which may prove or disprove that the construction of [20]
is optimal.
Further generalizations While this paper already
aims to provide a rather complete set of guidelines on what
to do in the various different fingerprinting games (with
different amounts of side-information, and different com-
putational assumptions on the decoder), there are some
further generalizations that were not considered here due
to lack of space. We mention two in particular:
• Larger alphabets: In this work we focused on the
binary case of q = 2 different symbols, but it may be
advantageous to work with larger alphabet sizes q > 2,
since the code length decreases linearly with q. For
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the results about decoders we did not really use that
we were working with a binary alphabet, so it seems
a straightforward exercise to prove that the q-ary ver-
sions of the log-likelihood decoders also achieve capac-
ity. A harder problem seems to be to actually com-
pute these capacities in the various informed settings,
since the maximization problem then transforms from
a one-dimensional optimization problem to a (q − 1)-
dimensional optimization problem.
• Tuple decoding: As in [31], we can consider a set-
ting in between the simple and joint decoding settings,
where decisions to accuse are made based on looking
at tuples of users of size at most t. Tuple decoding
may offer a trade-off between the high complexity, low
code length of a joint decoder and the low complex-
ity, higher code length of a simple decoder, and so it
may be useful to know how the capacities scale in the
region 1 < t < c.
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